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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ENGAGEMENT OR CONTAINMENT OF ROGUES: THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA

BY

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ENGAGEMENT OR CONTAINMENT OF ROGUES: THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA

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ABSTRACT

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The United States has maintained unilateral sanctions against Muammar Qadhafi's Libya for almost 20 years. It has attempted to isolate Libya politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily since 1981 in an effort to reverse that country's support for international terrorism, regional subversion, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Similar to U.S. practice with other "rogue" states, such a policy of isolation has little to show in the way of positive results 20 years later. This paper will use U.S. policy toward Libya as a case study in judging the utility and practicality of using a "rogue" state construct, and containment as the policy of choice toward such a state. The paper will argue that the case of Libya shows that a policy of conditional engagement has far greater potential for altering that state's behavior than the present course of unilateral containment.

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CONTAINMENT OR ENGAGEMENT OF ROGUES: THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA

I don't think that works very well.

—Vice President Dick Cheney, on the use of unilateral sanctions to change a state's behavior

The United States has maintained unilateral sanctions against Muammar Qadhafi's Libya for almost 20 years in an effort to change Libya's perceived support for terrorism, regional subversion, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Demonized as a "patron saint of terrorism" during the Reagan Administration, Qadhafi's Libya remained an official "country of concern" in the last iteration of the Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy. The country has been isolated by successive rounds of increasingly intrusive American sanctions, and by limited sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council in 1992 for Libya's alleged involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

While Qadhafi remains firmly in power, the international environment has changed significantly over the past 20 years, providing an opportunity to reevaluate U.S. policy that seeks to contain "rogue" states by isolating them, using unilateral means if necessary. These far-reaching changes include the end of the Cold War, a reduction in terrorism on the world stage, acceptance of a peace process with Israel by Yassir Arafat and other Arab leaders, the January 2001 conclusion of the trial of two Libyans implicated in the Lockerbie bombing, and the arrival of a pro-business Bush Administration in Washington openly skeptical of the utility of unilateral sanctions.³

This paper will look at the recent phenomenon of heavy resort to sanctions to punish or isolate states in order to seek a behavioral change, particularly in "rogue" states. The paper will chronicle the development of the U.S. "rogue nation" concept, using Libya as a case study to address the whole concept of identifying "rogues" and singling them out as deserving of special attention.

The U.S. experience with Libya illustrates the artificial nature of a rogue state construct and the shallowness of unilaterally isolating problem states. Each "rogue" state is a unique international actor that needs to be understood separately before national policy tools can be effectively employed. To better pursue its national interests, the United States should abandon

its unilateral containment of such states in favor of a more flexible policy of conditional engagement.

SANCTIONS AND ROGUE STATES

American relations with Libya have broad similarities to those it has with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. All these states have arguably been demonized by various U.S. administrations as outlaw governments, backlash states, pariahs and rogues. One thing they all have in common is that their governments remain in power despite years of American attempts to isolate and contain them. Another thing in common they share is the experience of how that containment has been pursued – through the use of unilateral U.S. sanctions.

THE GROWTH OF SANCTIONS

The United States has imposed sanctions as a tool of foreign policy throughout its history, since Thomas Jefferson sought to take the high moral ground with the use of "peaceable coercion" in the early 1800s. More recently, it has imposed sanctions over 100 times since World War II, but almost two-thirds of that total has occurred in the last decade. Former Secretary of State Albright has stated they are a "useful" policy tool, while other senior State officials have noted they can be "a valuable tool for enforcing international norms and protecting...national interests be when applied as part of a coherent strategy.

This explosive growth in the use of sanctions has been applied across the board by the United States to deter, coerce, signal, and punish countries for everything from support of terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, development of ballistic missiles, drug trafficking, environmental concerns, to engaging in regional aggression. Broadly speaking, sanctions have been employed as a tool to --

- Change the behavior or policy of a state that is seen to be in violation of international norms, without resorting to military force.
- Curtail the resources available to the affected state that enable it to carry out certain behavior
- Change the regime of the affected state.
- Isolate or punish the affected state.
- Register disapproval or moral condemnation of the affected state.

Reasons for the popularity of sanctions are varied, and range from the end of the Cold War and the subsequent lack of vital interests at stake that would justify military action to the perceived need to be seen to be doing "something" in reaction to a state's behavior. ⁶ The

growth of domestic political constituencies seeking to influence policy, along with Congress' own efforts to shape policy, have also contributed to the expanding use of sanctions. And while sanctions are often seen as the "liberal" alternative to war, they have been supported at times by both sides of the political aisle. This has particularly been true in the case of countries such as Libya and the other pariahs.

Despite this frequent recourse to sanctions in the recent past, there is little reference to economic tools of coercion in the National Security Strategy. Instead, that document focuses heavily on engagement and enlargement, seeking to bolster America's prosperity by promoting an open international trading system. This lack of explicit executive branch policy, combined with Congressional moves to often unilaterally impose sanctions itself, has resulted in haphazard application of this policy tool. Academic study has determined, for example, that sanctions have been effective only in one-quarter to one-third of the occasions when they were imposed, and even that limited success record occurred before globalization had spread to the extent it has today. In particular, unilateral sanctions appear to have been largely ineffective in dealing with "rogue" states such as Libya, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. They also appear to have done little to change Chinese behavior in the twenty years after the Korean War when the United States maintained sanctions against that regime.

Given this track record, a case can be made that the indiscriminate use of sanctions is a meaningless gesture. As noted by a senior State Department spokesman, "ineffective sanctions do not send a message of U.S. resolve or U.S. commitment...they send a message of U.S. irrelevance." In addition to potentially making the United States irrelevant, ineffective sanctions also pose collateral costs to civilians in the affected country, third parties (including allies), and domestic U.S. constituents that can outweigh any potential gain.

While seeking to influence governments, sanctions frequently result in unintended hardships being imposed upon a country's general populace – Iraq being a classic case in point. And while sanctions may not be strong enough to change government behavior, they potentially can strengthen bad government by providing an external bogey that the government can use as justification for its behavior. Rogue states in particular tend to be insecure regimes, in which case sanctions that seek to punish and isolate may just exacerbate the problem by pushing the state to embrace further policies such as "terrorism" and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction as a means to protect itself.

In addition to the unintended consequences internal to the affected state, unilateral sanctions also potentially have high costs to direct U.S. interests. Banning U.S. businesses from trading with countries obviously will result in lost opportunities and influence. European

and Asian competitors have been more than content to fill the economic vacuum left by the absence of U.S. commercial interests, costing U.S. firms (and U.S. government tax coffers) billions of dollars. Similarly, U.S. attempts to impose "secondary" sanctions (extraterritorial) against countries that deal with states the United States has targeted have been met with outrage by U.S. allies and friends. The 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which imposed such sanctions, caused such a disruption to transatlantic relations that neither the Clinton Administration, nor to date the Bush one, have enforced the provisions that would penalize third parties.

The potential for sanctions to be effective is dependent upon the nature of the regime the sanctions are imposed against, the structure of its economy, and its relative interaction with the outside world; the degree of international support in observing the sanctions; and the willingness and ability to enforce them. Resorting to sanctions without weighing all these factors may predispose that policy option to failure. Oversimplifying a regime's character as "rogue" in nature is an example of how the United States has attempted to modify a targeted state's behavior without ever coming to terms with what that state's behavior really is or how it fits in the international arena.

CREATING AND ISOLATING ROGUES

The emergence of a rogue state paradigm has been assessed as a "central component" of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, a product of a uniquely American political culture. This culture is one that perceives international relations as a moral struggle between good and evil, "demonizes" its foes as a means for mobilizing otherwise nonexistent or marginal policy support, and uses isolated domestic constituencies to influence and promote international policies. It is a paradigm that began with the Reagan Administration and has been supported by all others since, despite the fact that it has no standing in international law and has not been embraced by any other country.¹¹

The question of whether to contain rogue states through isolation or to engage them in some manner is one that presupposes first that a class of "rogue" states that are different from others even exists. The term "rogue" itself has been in common use only since 1994 and was popularized by the Clinton Administration, ¹² before the phrase "state of concern" began to replace "rogue" in formal documents during that Administration's final year in office. ¹³

The concept of the existence of "rogue" states is also of recent origin, emerging with publication in the Export Administration Act of 1979 of a "terrorist list" of countries accused by the Secretary of State of sponsoring international terrorism (Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South

Yemen). The theme of state-sponsored terrorism resonated heavily with the Reagan Administration, which in 1985 identified Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua as "outlaw" states that were part of a new "Murder Incorporated."

The Reagan preoccupation with international terrorism was reflected in the evolving definition of what constituted a pariah, outlaw, or rogue state (the terms generally being interchangeable and somewhat chronological in terms of popular usage). In the 1970s, governments in Uganda (Idi Amin) and Cambodia (Pol Pot) were the standard bearers of bad behavior, but their notoriety was derived from their *internal* behavior of repression and heavy-handedness. The focus on international terrorism began a shift toward looking at *external* behavior as the criterion for rogue status. This shift reflected a U.S. emphasis on castigating states not for being "bad" countries internally, but because they are threats to U.S. interests.

Robert S. Litwak has written that this shift from focusing on internal to external behavior as a determinant of rogue status is reflective of the liberal-realist schools of political thought in American foreign policy. Under the rogue policy begun under Reagan but continued under Clinton, the internal nature of a regime was not what was important for U.S. policy purposes. Indeed, if it were, several U.S. "friends" logically might have to be included in such a category. Rather, the following three characteristics of external behavior are what have come to be used in branding a state as a "rogue":15

- The use of international terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
- The pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
- The threatening or destabilization of neighboring states that may be important to U.S. interests (e.g., Israel, South Korea).

An additional feature that current rogue states have in common (formally identified in 1994 by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake as Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba¹⁶) is their rather diminished stature on the international scene. The power differential between the United States and these states is a key aspect of how the United States reacts toward them.

U.S. policy toward the old Soviet Union and toward China today has seen different phases but generally sought, even during Cold War containment, to change communist behavior by engaging them, not by branding them as outcasts and completely isolating them. There is more than a little whiff of double standard and hypocrisy resident in current rogue policy that leaves it open to arguable dissent.

The latter point boils down to the issue of political selectivity, one of three main criticisms made against rogue policy. Syria, a nation that meets all the criteria of a rogue state listed above, is not on the official list of rogues. As an influential nation that has a considerable impact

on the Middle East peace process, Syria has been diplomatically cultivated by the United States. Cuba, a state that does not meet the criteria, is nonetheless included on the list. The case of Cuba is the most prominent example of American political culture that sees domestic political constituencies influencing the policy process. In addition to the Cuban-American lobby that has successfully encouraged the isolation of Cuba, the American Jewish lobby (Iran) and Pan Am 103 families (Libya) also have made significant impacts on who remains on the rogue list.

A second criticism against a generic rogue policy is that it limits strategic flexibility. By successfully "demonizing" rogue states, it becomes almost impossible to shift policy or even to refine it when circumstances change, as Secretary of State Powell has experienced in his desire to move to more targeted "smart" sanctions against Irag.¹⁷

A third criticism deals with the high political costs it carries with allies that overshadow any gains. Identification and isolation of rogue states is a policy rejected by America's allies. The Helms-Burton Act (Cuba) and ILSA (Iran, Libya) in 1996 were vigorously opposed by U.S. allies, who threatened to bring the issue to the World Trade Organization if the United States took any action against their companies. European and Asian allies alike have generally tended to view engagement as a more practical and effective policy against problem states.

The issue of containment versus engagement is one that Litwak argues is an artificial construct that the very existence of a rogue policy creates: "the rogue state approach distorts U.S. policy and undermines its effectiveness by lumping a disparate group of countries under this pejorative rubric. In so doing, it leads to a generic approach to policy-making that obscures the particularities of individual cases and reinforces the false dichotomy between "containment" and "engagement." ¹⁸

A compelling argument can be made from all this that rogues are not a distinct category of nations, as has been argued by successive administrations, but are instead the result of politically motivated strategy. ¹⁹ The identification of rogues by their threat to U.S. interests rather than by their internal behavior, the process of demonizing those selected and setting them apart from the rest of civilized world, and the one-size-fits-all strategy all suggest the development of a policy lacking "nuance" or even a real understanding of the countries being targeted.

THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA

The lack of understanding of the target country and the consequent adoption of a counterproductive policy that embodies all the criticisms of roguism have been played out over the past 20 years between Washington and Tripoli. It explains how a major international news

weekly, echoing the sentiment of the times, could seriously ask whether a man in charge of a desert country of less than three million people in 1981 was "the most dangerous man in the world," as he was labeled by the Reagan Administration.²⁰

The story of modern Libya is essentially the story of Muammar Qadhafi, and it is his policies that have led to the attempted American isolation and containment of Libya. He has been described as crazy, erratic, goofy, evil, insane, irrational, demented, a madman, and the patron saint and Daddy Warbucks of terrorism.²¹ His opponents, no doubt occasionally embellishing a remark to push their point, have created a cottage industry in ascribing to him the problems of the world, turning him into a near-mythical figure of evil.

It is one thing for bitter opponents such as Anwar Sadat to describe Qadhafi as "100 percent sick and possessed of the demon" or for Jaafar Nimeiry to say he has a "split personality, both of them evil," but it is quite another for U.S. policy makers to engage in such hyperbole. The name-calling that has been associated with Qadhafi reflects a deeper problem, one of a consistent U.S. practice of misreading his policies or failure to place them into context. Such a failure has encouraged development of concepts such as "rogue" states, which seek to attribute actions the United States doesn't like to the irrational work of madmen, rather than a legitimate pursuit of national interests.

At least one commentator has suggested a cultural and political problem exists in the West at large that renders it unable to acknowledge that someone from a backward or Islamic state such as Libya could have a valid history and culture and religious tradition.²³ Indeed, one American author asserts that it "strains credulity" to believe that Qadhafi's behavior is simply the product of being a resentful Arab nationalist, and goes on to suggest that Qadhafi's sanity is questionable or that he has a drug abuse problem.²⁴ Such displays of cultural prejudice are a pattern often repeated that arguably have distorted U.S. policy.

U.S. INTERESTS AND THE ORIGINS OF A ROGUE

When Muammar Qadhafi and his group of "Free Officers" ended the regime of King Idris in a bloodless coup on 1 September 1969, the United States' primary interests in the Middle East included containment of the Soviet Union, secure access to oil, and support for the security of Israel. Of the three, Qadhafi initially was opposed only to the latter, and the same could be said for today. It is interesting to note, however, that Qadhafi came to be seen by some U.S. officials as a threat to all three interests, plus a fourth of regional stability that especially became prominent during the Reagan Administration.

In determining the nature of the Qadhafi-Libya "threat" that eventually landed Libya a top spot in the U.S. rogues' gallery, it is necessary to look at Libyan capabilities and intentions. But it is also critical to look at the underlying principles of Libyan policy under Qadhafi, ascertain where they conflict with U.S. interests, and only then craft a policy that addresses the conflicts. Conflict and disagreement between states is not new or unusual; what is unusual is the degree to which the United States has sought to demonize Libya. The question for U.S. policy makers is thus whether Qadhafi is intrinsically evil and deserving of extraordinary treatment, or whether he is similar to other leaders with whom the United States has disagreements. In other words, has the United States ever really understood the targeted state?

While a psychological profile of Qadhafi is well beyond the bounds of this paper, a case could be made that the story of Qadhafi is the story of a naïve, spoiled boy with too much money in his pocket. When granted independence under UN auspices in December 1951, Libya was a "prototype of a poor country." The country was essentially a barren desert with few people and no known resources. Prior to the discovery of oil in 1959, its primary source of income was from the sale of scrap metal from World War II battlefields and rent payments received from the United States and the United Kingdom for military bases near Tripoli and Tobruk.

While poverty was widespread, so also was an Arab-Islamic heritage that formed the core of Qadhafi's identity. A young Qadhafi could look about him and see a small poor country that had been colonized by Italy after a brutal guerrilla war, with all the choice lands and benefits going to Italian colonialists. He could see and hear American and British warplanes flying from Libyan soil for their own purposes. When oil was discovered, he could watch other Westerners come to Libya and gain control of Libya's only great resource, building nice houses for themselves while many Libyans lived in shantytowns. At the same time, he watched as impotent Arab governments were defeated by an Israeli state that lived on land "stolen" from the Palestinians. Added to all this was the rise of Nasser in Egypt and his pan-Arab exhortations on Radio Cairo's Voice of the Arabs.

By September 1969, a twenty-something Qadhafi was a staunch Muslim, pan-Arabist, anti-Zionist, and anti-imperialist. He also harbored an antipathy toward a "West" that had colonized his country and run it as their personnel fiefdom and also supported a Zionist government he felt was illegitimate and engaged in criminal behavior against fellow Arabs. On the day after he took power, Qadhafi summoned a representative of Egypt's President Nasser and told him that Libya's "revolution" had been made for Nasser. The Free Officers' goal was to

unite with Egypt, providing Libya's resources for the Arab struggle against Israel. Nasser's representative found Qadhafi to be "shockingly innocent-scandalously pure" in his outlook.²⁷

Qadhafi's anti-Zionist, anti-West, and pan-Arab/Islamist worldview was certainly not unusual or limited to himself and his Free Officers. While accused of being violent, xenophobic, Muslim zealots, in fact the views of these "scandalously pure" officers were pretty much in the mainstream of Arab and Third World thought, particularly areas that had a colonial past. Qadhafi's initial policy goals that grew out of such a common worldview likewise are not particularly noteworthy. Internally, he desired to take control of Libya's oil industry and use its wealth to advance Libya's interests. Externally, he sought to fulfill the dream of Arab unity, restore Palestine to the Palestinians, and support other "liberation" groups who were fighting domination by Western interests. Any number of governments could have supported these goals. What appears to have upset Western sensibilities was the reckless abandon with which the "shockingly innocent" Libyans entered the fray. Young, committed, and willing to break a few eggs to change the status quo, they were perceived as dangerous radicals.

Initial American reaction to Qadhafi has been described as one of "benign approval."²⁸ Qadhafi's nationalist, Islamic and anti-imperialist ideology made him an early critic of the Soviet Union, which meshed well with U.S. desires to keep that country marginalized in the Middle East. Although he accelerated the departure of U.S. and British military bases and led oil producer efforts to gain control of oil pricing and production levels from the oil companies, he did not nationalize the oil industry in Libya and allowed American companies to continue their profitable operations.²⁹ Only his virulent opposition to Israel was directly counter to U.S. interests.

Two early incidents in the Qadhafi regime that have been used to portray him as a dangerous psychotic³⁰ also highlight the apparent intellectual dishonesty in many denunciations of Qadhafi. In early 1970 Qadhafi dispatched his second in command, Major Jallud, to China to buy a nuclear bomb so that the Arab side would be able to match Israel's nuclear capability. And in April of 1973 Qadhafi ordered an Egyptian submarine then stationed in Tripoli to sortie out and sink the Queen Elizabeth II, which had been chartered by wealthy Jews to take them to Israel. ³¹

Clearly, had Qadhafi been successful in either of these endeavors catastrophe would have resulted and U.S. interests would have been at risk in the Middle East. But there is nothing psychotic or demented about one party to a conflict wanting to achieve weapon parity with the other. Likewise, the attempt on the QE II was not planned as a terrorist act to kill innocent civilians. Rather, it was to be retribution for Israel having shot down a Libyan civilian B-

727 airliner just two months previously. While Israel admitted it had made a mistake, one can only imagine what the reaction would have been had Libya mistakenly shot down an El Al plane.

Qadhafi's action in both cases was not the work of an intrinsically evil mind. As Nasser's confident Mohamed Heikal has written, Qadhafi was simply "capable of gross oversimplification" and was a "simple puritan caught up in a world of intrigue and maneuver." This is not to excuse his behavior, but simply to illustrate how ascribing the wrong motives to his actions can lead to potentially false policy options for dealing with him.

The demonization of Libya into a rogue state has at its roots an intellectual dishonesty about what it is the United States objects to about Libya. A case can be made that it is not what Libya does, or how it does it that upsets the United States, but simply that it is *Libya* that is doing it. Israel has nuclear weapons with no outcry from the United States, so it would appear it is not really the issue of WMD proliferation that is at stake, just who gets them. Similarly, Libya may support "terrorist" groups such as the IRA and the old FROLINAT in Chad, but then Americans in New York and Boston support the IRA as well, 33 and the United States supports groups such as UNITA in Angola. Castigating Libya as a rogue nation that is unique in employing certain practices and pursuing certain goals is little more than putting one's head in the sand, while obscuring what should be central issue: do Libyan actions threaten U.S. interests? And if they do, how best to counter them?

ACCELERATION TO CONFRONTATION

While Qadhafi railed against Western imperialism, clamped down on foreign influences in Libya, and usurped power from the oil companies, prior to 1974 the main disagreement between the United States and Libya was over U.S. support for Israel. Joseph Palmer, the last U.S. Ambassador to Libya, reportedly asked to be recalled to Washington in 1972 because the Libyan government refused to deal with him due to such support.³⁴

A series of events in the mid-1970s, however, led Qadhafi to embrace "the dark side of power and politics"³⁵ that brought him increasingly into confrontation with the United States. Increasingly isolated from his fellow Arab leaders and feeling many had sold out the Palestinians, he set out to recreate the world in his own image. He transformed Libya internally into a "state of the masses," seeking populist inputs but retaining ultimate control himself. Externally, he sought out an independent supply of arms and supported various "liberation" groups in an attempt to continue to fight what he perceived to be injustices, alone and on his own terms if need be.

The litany of Libyan excesses in the 1970s are now common grist for the mill, and have been used to criticize early U.S. engagement with Libya that emphasized conciliation and restraint. Despite U.S. restraint and attempts to work with Libya, the argument goes, by the time the Reagan Administration was sworn in Libya had become the most strident opponent of the Middle East peace process, was arming and training radical Palestinian groups and other "terrorists," had invaded Chad and sponsored an attack on Tunisia, was in the process of subverting every North African government and many others further south, and had imported billions of dollars of modern Soviet weaponry while also becoming a "client" of the Soviet Union.³⁶

By 1974 Qadhafi's fervent pursuit of Arab unity was in tatters. At one time or another he tried to unite and merge Libya with all of its neighboring states, and some that were further afield. The flames of Nasser's pan-Arabism, however, had died considerably by this time, and no Arab leader was going to dilute his power by sharing it with another state.

In addition to being rebuffed on Arab unity, Qadhafi was also rebuffed in the fight against Israel. He was not brought in on Arab planning for the October 1973 war with Israel until after Egyptian forces had crossed the Suez. Nor did he have any say in negotiations after the war that exchanged territory between Egypt and Israel and ultimately led to the Camp David Accords.

He also was left out of the initial planning for an Arab oil boycott of the United States, and was being stonewalled by the United States, United Kingdom, and France on his requests for arms. And if the collapse of his foreign policy goals weren't enough, he also suffered defections from his core group of Free Officers, which apparently affected him deeply.³⁷

The combination of all these factors led to a sharp radicalization in Libyan policy. Seeing what he believed was a sellout of the Palestinian cause and outraged at his exclusion from war planning, Libya became a key member of the "rejectionist" front denouncing any form of accommodation with Israel. Desiring to keep up the fight against Israel and having no place else to turn, Libya concluded a multi-billion dollar arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1974, increased its arming and training of Palestinian factions, and fought a border skirmish against Egypt in 1977. Unsuccessful in promoting Arab unity, Libyan subversion of neighboring states sought agents more amenable to supporting Libyan policy, while Qadhafi also engaged former American CIA officers and Army Special Forces soldiers to provide him with specialized equipment and weaponry readily adaptable to unconventional warfare or terrorism.³⁸ Stunned by high-level defections at home, Qadhafi purged the Army, began hunting down defectors,

approved the first executions of anti-regime opponents in 1977,³⁹ and began assassinating Libyan dissidents ("stray dogs") in Europe in 1980.

Some of the evils attributed to Qadhafi by the United States are questionable, and appear orchestrated to assist pursuit of an anticommunist agenda by the United States, combined with its desire to respond to the wave of political terrorism that was prevalent in Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s. Qadhafi's receipt of massive amounts of Soviet military hardware, combined with the Cold Warrior mentality of many in the Reagan Administration, encouraged the view that Libya, under Soviet direction, was prepared to "exploit political strains in Northern Africa to foster anti-American political change." Libyan military intervention into Chad was highlighted by the Administration as evidence of Soviet-inspired regional subversion, though Libyan claims to parts of northern Chad have some historical legal merit. One could also argue that Libyan intervention on the side of one of the Chadian factions was as legitimate as interventions France or the United States have made on behalf of their clients in Africa. Similarly, the U.S. charge of Libyan sponsorship of an attack on Gafsa, Tunisia, in 1980 has also been credited to Algeria by other sources.

Besides serving as forward Soviet military base, Libya also was said to be serving as "an agent of the international Soviet-backed terrorist conspiracy." Such a conspiracy was widely publicized by the book The Terror Network by Claire Sterling, which also prominently featured Qadhafi as the "Daddy Warbucks of terrorism." Whatever the merits of concluding the Soviet Union was responsible for directing the widely disparate array of groups accused of terrorism, the book's allegations against Libya are made suspect by the author's numerous errors. These include incorrect but easily checked statements that oil was not discovered in Libya until after Qadhafi took power and that high level "terrorists" were put up at the Tripoli Hilton Hotel. 46

The purpose of this paper is not to trade charge and counter-charge over what Libya did or did not do in those times. But it is important to consider the causes of Libyan behavior, look again at its goals, and determine if Libya was a "normal" state pursuing its interests or a "rogue" state out of control that needed to be isolated from the world. Libyan actions in the 1970s may have without a doubt been inimical to U.S. interests and regional stability, but they were not the result of irrational leaders. While one can disagree with his decisions, Qadhafi was reacting to setbacks to his policies and using tactics that were little different from those employed by many governments. While an irritant to U.S. policy, it would be hard to say that he posed much of a threat. As a diplomat assigned to Tripoli in 1981 observed, "where has one of these groups claimed victory because of Libyan help? Nowhere."

CREATING A ROGUE: CONTAINMENT AND DEMONIZATION

Looking at the Middle East through its Cold War and pro-Israeli lens, the Reagan Administration dramatically reversed previous U.S. policy of conciliation and restraint with one of open hostility and confrontation. Determined to root out what it considered to be a Soviet-directed terrorist state that threatened U.S. friends in the region, it embarked upon a program "almost unprecedented" in its aim "to settle its political differences…by openly espousing military confrontation, economic embargo, subversion, sabotage and assassination."

In the Administration's first year alone Libya's role as the "patron saint" of Soviet-backed terrorism was heavily touted, its diplomats were expelled from Washington, its neighbors were offered increased military assistance, its security was threatened by reports of a CIA-funded covert operation plan, and its claims to the Gulf of Sidra were rudely brushed aside when U.S. Navy jets shot down two Libyan fighters that had contested their right to be there. The Administration also claimed that first year that Libyan "hit" teams had entered the country to assassinate U.S. officials, and it asked American citizens working in Libya to leave the country, leaving the impression that it was clearing the decks for possible military action against the state.

The following year brought increased pressure, as the United States imposed an embargo on imports of Libyan crude oil and barred the sale of Boeing airliners. Acknowledging that the unilateral ban on oil would have limited effect on Libya since Libya could sell its oil elsewhere, the United States said the move was undertaken as means to insure the United States would not be subsidizing Libya's "terrorist" activities. While the United States had imported 40 percent of Libyan oil production in 1980, it was importing significantly less by 1982 and was itself not much affected by the ban. ⁴⁹ Although Exxon and Mobil pulled out of Libya when the ban was announced, other American oil companies that accounted for approximately 50 percent of total Libyan production remained. ⁵⁰

The Reagan clampdown on Libya appears to have had no impact on changing Libyan behavior, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 only served to further heighten Libyan opposition to Israel and support for Palestinian groups. In 1983 Libyan troops also reentered Chad, while in 1984 its aircraft bombed Ombdurman, Sudan, and Libyan agents working in their London embassy killed British policewoman Evonne Fletcher during a demonstration there by an anti-Qadhafi group. The Reagan Administration was also generally unsuccessful in getting its European allies to support its efforts to isolate and contain Libya. The United Kingdom, for example, while severing diplomatic ties after the killing of the policewoman, maintained its commercial ties with Libya.

U.S. efforts against Libya were intensified even further in 1986, following terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985 that the United States claimed had been executed with assistance from Libya. In January 1986 the United States imposed complete sanctions on Libya, prohibiting all direct trade, freezing Libyan assets in the United States, and forbidding Americans workers to travel to Libya. American oil companies were forced to abandon their fields in Libya, but were allowed to enter into "standstill" agreements that allowed them to retain ownership rights until they could sell their assets to the Libyan government. All subsequent revenue from oil lifted from the formerly American-operated fields went to the Libyan government, and the standstill agreements are still in effect. Theoretically the companies could return to claim their old holdings if sanctions are lifted, but would have no claim to any new reserves discovered since they left, and would be liable to invest in new exploration.⁵¹

In addition to the economic squeeze, 1986 witnessed a dramatic increase in U.S. military pressure against Libya. In March the Administration authorized the U.S. Sixth Fleet to once again challenge Libya's excessive maritime territorial claims by conducting operations within the Gulf of Sidra. In the ensuing confrontation, two Libyan patrol boats were sunk and Libyan surface to air missile sites were attacked. The following month the United States conducted airstrikes against Tripoli and Benghazi after it accused Libya of being responsible for the bombing of the La Belle disco in West Berlin, where two American off-duty soldiers were killed.⁵²

Despite the ramped up pressure from Washington, there is no indication Libyan policy toward Israel or its support for Palestinian "terrorists" had changed, though Libya had expelled a few groups. Libyan military units continued to operate in northern Chad, and if U.S. reports of Libyan complicity are accurate, Libya was also embarked on a chemical weapons program at Rabta in 1988 and provided basing and support for an attempted Palestinian seaborne attack against Israel in June 1990.

LOCKERBIE AND MULTILATERAL CONTAINMENT

Supporters of the confrontational approach taken by the Reagan Administration against Libya, who credit it with having had an effect on the general diminution of terrorist activity by the late 1980s, must have been a bit shocked by the announcements in October 1991 that Libyan agents were suspected of being behind both the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988 and French UTA flight 772 in September 1989. For Pan Am 103 in particular, conventional wisdom had long held that it was the work of Iran, possibly working with the radical Palestinian group PFLP-GC and Syria, in retaliation for the USS VINCENNES shootdown of an Iranian Airbus.⁵³

One could be forgiven for being a cynic when "new" information that became the basis for the charges turned up in the form of a Libyan defector shortly after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, and Iran and Syria both became instrumental to coalition efforts to contain Saddam Hussein. Be that as it may, the involvement of British and French interests in these incidents offered the United States the first real opportunity to get approval for multilateral sanctions against Libya. In a broad policy shift reflecting perhaps a new world order, this was the path taken to force Libya to surrender the suspects for trial, rather than resort to unilateral military action as had been done for the La Belle disco bombing. The United States in the 1990s has backed off its previously high profile policy of military pressure on Libya, and has been content to try to isolate Libya economically and politically.

With the Soviet Union no longer around to exercise its veto, movement in the Middle East peace process that marginalized radical Arab states, and a general drop in the popularity of ideological crusades, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 748 in March 1992. The resolution imposed an air and arms embargo on Libya until it extradited two suspects in the Lockerbie bombing. It was strengthened the following year by UNSCR 883, which banned the sale to Libya of equipment that would enable it produce downstream petroleum products.

The UN limited sanctions were in place for several years, reportedly causing a nuisance for Libya and restricting its flexibility, but not threatening its economic well being since European nations were not willing to go along with a U.S oil embargo.⁵⁴ After several years, with no progress evident and the sanctions dragging on regardless, cracks began appearing in the effort to isolate Libya. The Vatican restored diplomatic relations in 1997, and South African President Nelson Mandela visited Libya the same year. Both South Africa and Saudi Arabia personally lobbied President Clinton in 1998 to ease sanctions against Libya,⁵⁵ and the OAU said it would begin ignoring sanctions by September of that year if the United States and the United Kingdom did not agree to try the Pan Am 103 suspects in a third country. Several African heads of state flew to Libya in September in defiance of the air travel ban.

The eventual Libyan surrender of two suspects to The Hague in April 1999 occurred after personal intervention by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and continued lobbying in Tripoli by President Mandela and Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar. It resulted in a suspension in UN sanctions and the restoration of UK-Libya diplomatic relations. The January 2001 verdict in the Lockerbie trial, in which one Libyan was found guilty, has led to calls that the UN sanctions should be lifted permanently. The United States and the United

Kingdom have stated Libya must first accept responsibility for the bombing and pay compensation to families of the victims.⁵⁶

EFFECTS OF CONTAINMENT AND ISOLATION

The apparent success of limited UN sanctions on Libya in getting Libya to change its position regarding the surrender of the Lockerbie suspects suggests some shortcomings in current U.S. policy. The U.S. policy of going it alone, declaring a rogue nation, and then containing that nation unilaterally does not appear, after 20 years, to have borne much fruit. A little bit of action by a lot of people, limited in scope and not regime threatening, seems to have been more successful than a lot of threatening action done unilaterally. UN sanctions were targeted with a specific aim in mind, they did not ostracize Libya, and they clearly did not intend to bring the country to its knees.

The U.S. imposition of sanctions and embargoes, use of military force, support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow the regime, and even the attempt to legislate extraterritorial sanctions in 1996 with ILSA arguably had little positive impact on Libyan behavior. Indeed, if one is to believe the Libyan government approved the Pan Am and UTA bombings, they may even have contributed to a worsening in Libyan behavior. And apart from Libya, U.S. policy has had negative impacts on U.S. commercial interests, as well as on U.S. relations with key European allies.

It is not just the severity of U.S. actions against Libya that is questionable, but the entire concept of designating a rogue state and demonizing it as something below contempt that is to be kept isolated from international discourse. While Qadhafi has pursued policies that conflict with U.S. interests, it is difficult to accept the notion that his regime behaves in a manner that is uniquely evil and not replicated by other nations. The entire rogue concept is not supported by other nations of the world, including those who have greater stakes in dealing with the offending state.

Despite his alleged attempts to subvert all his neighbors, Qadhafi is supported today by the Arab League in his desire to have sanctions lifted. Countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have had violent disagreements and run-ins with Libya in the past, find it within themselves to engage Libya and lobby the United States on its behalf. Clearly a case can be made that the United States has not only overestimated the threat Libya poses, but that it has also not understood the nature of the targeted state.

The rogue concept is an artificial construct that borders on intellectual laziness that precludes the opportunity to adjust strategies as necessary to address threats to U.S. interests.

Given the selective nature of the regimes the concept is applied to, it also has the look of a bully. Why did the U.S. superpower demonize an insignificant Libya and stick its finger in Qadhafi's eye? Because it could.

While unilateral U.S. efforts did not work, the degree to which the UN sanctions were successful is an open question also. One could wonder if it was international community pressure that changed Libya's mind, or if it was the changing international environment. With no Soviet Union to balance off the United States, acceptance of Israel acknowledged by Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO; and with the loss of credibility of revolutionary ideology in the globalization era, both at home and abroad, Qadhafi may well have simply realized that today's world is not the one with which he previously had been grappling.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Retaining a rogue state policy is inhibiting the United States from choosing strategies that might better serve U.S. interests. The question regarding U.S. relations with Libya need not be a zero sum game of engagement or containment. As suggested by Litwak, what is needed is a "nuanced assessment of strategic options along a continuum of choice." Recognizing that engagement is not a panacea, Haass and O'Sullivan have also recommended "nuance" in pursuing a policy of "conditional engagement" of rogue states. Such a policy has at its heart the use of incentives along with more punitive tools of diplomacy.

U.S. allies such as France and the United Kingdom arguably have more at stake in Libya than does the United States. Terrorism in the past was focused mainly in the Mediterranean and Europe, not in the United States, and regional instability in the Mediterranean affected European security more directly than it did that of the United States. Yet these countries have continued to trade with and talk to Libya.

The key to success of such a policy is knowing *when* and *how* to engage; it is an iterative and interactive process and not, as indicated, a choice of all or nothing. Engagement of rogues risks charges of appearement and moral hazard, and so it is necessary to be able to switch back to containment, or a combination of engagement and containment, if the policy is not producing results. This provides flexibility in options that the rogue state policy does not.

To answer the when question, five recommendations have been proposed:59

- When dealing with a regime that has concentrated decision-making power;
 such a regime can commit to a relationship
- When domestic support for engagement exists

- When pursuing modest goals; don't threaten regime survival or there will be no basis for negotiation and progress
- When you can retain the option of disengaging if engagement fails to achieve the desired results
- When coordination with allies and the international system can be effected to ensure broad support

The *how* question can basically be met by adoption of a roadmap whereby conditions for success can be measured and each party knows exactly what is required before relations can advance to the next level.

Such a construct would be more useful for the United States in its efforts to moderate Libyan behavior with regard to pursuit of WMD, support for terrorism, and regional destabilization. This has especially been true since the surrender of the two Libyans to The Hague for the Lockerbie trial - a U.S. official was quoted in early 2000 as having admitted Libya was no longer in the "terrorism business."

Isolating Libya provides the United States no leverage with Tripoli. Instead, it encourages an insecure Libya to continue developing WMD, maintaining rigid internal controls on its people, and militarizing its society in an attempt to protect itself against a perceived threat of regime survival. Isolating Libya means the United States can effect no moderating influence on the Libyan people and has no cover for intelligence collection or means to gain on-scene understanding of developments. It also will invariably result in Libya's future leadership being estranged from the United States.

Reestablishing diplomatic and commercial relations, tied to a roadmap that requires reciprocal Libyan action, potentially offers the United States a huge opportunity to monitor, cajole, and co-opt Libya. Americans and American things have always been popular in Libya. Although anecdotal, the decades-long antipathy between the United States and Libya make it somewhat interesting to note that while Qadhafi may be "anti-America" at times, he has not been anti-American. The point is of interest because of the degree to which Qadhafi has been vilified for his alleged hatred of and threat to Americans. Americans previously working in Libya have not been threatened, and indeed have been eagerly sought after to work in the country. It has been standard procedure for Qadhafi to make noises each time a new Administration comes to Washington about improving U.S.-Libyan relations. Libyans, like many others in the world, will complain about American economic, political, or cultural imperialism, but at the same time seem to prefer U.S. goods and services.

The prospects of a restoration of at least commercial relations following the Lockerbie verdict have many Libyans hoping for a return of American business. "We talk American," one Libyan recently told National Geographic, "we use American equipment. We never stopped dealing with Americans." The ameliorating effect on internal Libyan support for radical policies that interpersonal relationships developed between private U.S. and Libyan citizens can have should not be underestimated.

The United States should also let ILSA lapse when it comes up for renewal in September. This attempt to levy secondary sanctions has questionable legality, and has caused extraordinary damage to U.S. relations with some of its strongest allies. It is an unfortunate example of how small domestic constituencies can influence Congress to pass laws that are not in the interest of the nation as a whole.

In addition to opening up an embassy with State personnel, the United States should also accredit a Defense Attaché to Tripoli. As part of the roadmap, this officer initially should be a professional intelligence officer, to make it clear to Libya that their behavior is being closely monitored, though openly. Opening a DAO office also offers the opportunity to reestablish low-level military-to-military ties, potentially a large confidence building measure in a country run by military officers.

Smart, or targeted sanctions can continue to be employed in areas of concern, such as military equipment and material related to WMD. While the U.S needs to learn to distinguish between legitimate support for Palestinian rights and terrorist actions, it can retain the right to strike swiftly if it is found that Libya is responsible for supporting a terrorist incident. In today's increasingly interdependent, globalized world, however, one could reasonably assume that the attraction of terrorism and regional destabilization no longer holds much sway in Libya.

The latter thought illustrates the point that the time is right to rethink America's rogue policy. The world in 2001 has changed dramatically since 1981; most notably the end of the Cold War and the spread of the global economy have changed the way states interact and perceive their interests. The Bush Administration also seems more predisposed to drop unilateral sanctions in favor of some form of engagement, if previous statements by Vice President Cheney accurately reflect its current thinking.⁶²

Unfortunately, the prevalence of rogue state groupthink in Congress, combined with the Pan Am 103 relatives lobby, will make any move toward conditional engagement problematic at best. Libya has previously offered compensation to the relatives (and has already paid it to UTA relatives), however, and there is no reason to suspect that issue cannot be resolved. The major stumbling block will revolve around the issue of responsibility for Lockerbie.

U.S. insistence on Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombing before the United States will lift unilateral restrictions is an issue that must be carefully evaluated, given the paucity of information that has been made public on the issue. While the ICJ found one Libyan guilty, the trial did not mention government culpability. It is entirely possible that Libyan agents were involved with Lockerbie without Qadhafi's approval. South Africa's Nelson Mandela, no supporter of state-sponsored terrorism, feels linking the lifting of sanctions with accepting responsibility is "totally unacceptable." He has noted that his own intelligence services often took action without notifying him beforehand, and that unless there is evidence that Qadhafi gave the orders, it's unfair to hold him responsible.⁶³

Lest one feel Mandela is being coy or naïve, one only has to remember the activities of Ed Wilson and Frank Terpil, former CIA officers who worked for Qadhafi without U.S. government sanction. Many U.S. officials who should have known better continued to deal with them until CIA director Stansfield Turner shook up CIA's clandestine services and ordered that all contact be ended.⁶⁴

Of all the goals for sanctions listed on page 2, none have been realized in the case of U.S. unilateral action against Libya, except for registering disapproval and moral condemnation. After twenty unproductive years of making a statement, in an era where U.S. officials have stated Libya is not pursuing terrorism, it is time for the United States to try more meaningful policy options and deal directly, if conditionally, with Libya.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Offers Help in Containing Libya," <u>International Herald Tribune</u>, 4 June 1981, p. 1.

² William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington, DC:

The White House, December 1999), 42.

³ the opening quote by Vice President Cheney was made on Fox News Sunday, 28

January 2001.

⁴ Stuart Eizenstat, "Economic Sanctions," <u>Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee</u>, 3 June 1998, available from http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980603_eizen_sanctions.html; Internet;

accessed 4 October 2000.

⁵ Ibid., and Madelyn Albright, "Statement on U.S. Sanctions Against Burma," April 22, 1997, available from http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970422.html; Internet; accessed 4 October 2000.

⁶ See, for example, Richard N. Haass, ed., <u>Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy</u> (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 1-3.

⁷ Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security (Fall

1997), in The Wilson Quarterly, v22 no 1 (Winter 1998): 121-122.

⁸ Stuart Eizenstat, "Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee," May 27, 1999, available from http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990527_eizen_sanctions.html; Internet; accessed 4 October 2000.

⁹ Meghan L. O'Sullivan, "Sanctioning Rogue States," <u>Harvard International Review</u>, Summer 2000, 22, no. 2 (3950 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis,

Bell&Howell.

¹⁰ Patrick Clawson, "Iran," in <u>Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy</u>, ed. Richard N. Haass (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 92.

¹¹ Robert S. Litwak, <u>Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War</u> (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 63, 75.

¹²Ibid., 62.

¹³ For an example, see Clinton.

¹⁴ Litwak, 53.

¹⁵ Ibid., 49-52.

¹⁶ Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," <u>Foreign Affairs</u> 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 60.

¹⁷ Ben Barber, "Powell Defends Sanctions Policy, <u>Washington Times</u>, 7 March 2001, sec 1, p. 1.

¹⁸ Litwak, 74.

¹⁹ Ibid., 239.

²⁰ Bob Levin and Elaine Sciolino, "Kaddafy's Dangerous Game," <u>Newsweek</u> (international edition, 20 July 1981): cover.

²¹ The latter description awarded by Claire Sterling, <u>The Terror Network</u> (New York: Berkley Books, 1982), 241.

²² Levin and Sciolino, 16.

²³ P. Edward Haley, <u>Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969</u> (New York: Praeger, 1984), 12.

²⁴ Brian L. Davis, <u>Qaddafi, Terrorism</u>, and the <u>Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya</u> (New York: Praeger, 1990), 22.

²⁵ Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development; Problems, Principles & Policies, revised ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), 326.

²⁶While identified early in his rule as being a pro-Islamist, Qadhafi later came into conflict with religious leaders due to his policies and ideas. See Ray Takeyh, "Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam," Washington Quarterly 21, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 159-172; for an account of the Islamic opposition to Qadhafi.

²⁷ Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), 64-65.

²⁸ John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm: The Complete Account of Qaddafi's Revolution (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 80.

²⁹ See Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Countries and the World They Shaped (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), and Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975) for a discussion of Libva's role in international Crisis (oil policy.

30 Davis.

³¹ Heikal, 71; 196-197.

³² Ibid., 189; 192.

³³ For example, the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom recently petitioned Washington to invoke the Terrorism Act of 1996 against Irish groups in the U.S. thought to be providing weapons to Irish paramilitaries. See T.R. Reid, "U.S. Ties to N. Ireland Weapons Alleged," Washington Post, 20 February 2001, sec. A, p. 1.

34 Haley, 24.

- ³⁵ Ibid., 35.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 4-9.

³⁷ Cooley, 167.

³⁸ In-depth reviews of the connection between Libya and former CIA officer Ed Wilson are found in Peter Maas, Manhunt: The Incredible Pursuit of a CIA Agent Turned Terrorist (New York: Jove Books, 1986) and Joseph C. Goulden, The Death Merchant (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

39 Cooley, 248, 167.

⁴⁰ Statement by Dr. Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, quoted by Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong Into Confrontation?" International Affairs 58 no. 1 (March 1982): 18.

⁴¹ Gwerzman, Ibid.

- ⁴² Wright, 34.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 32.
- ⁴⁴ Quote from the Washington Post, as reported by Wright, 17.

⁴⁵ Sterling, Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 241 and 247. Oil was discovered in 1959, Qadhafi took power in 1969. There is not now, nor has there ever been, a Hilton Hotel in Libva.

⁴⁷ Levin and Sciolino, 17.

⁴⁸ Wright, 18.

⁴⁹ Gideon Rose, "Libya," in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard Haass (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998): 131.

⁵⁰ General Accounting Office, Possible Energy Effects of a U.S. Ban on Libyan Oil

Imports (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 24 February 1982), 6.

Leon Daniel, former Chief Engineer for Occidental Petroleum, telephone interview by author, 5 March 2001. Such investments may make a return non-economical. Occidental, for example, has a \$125 million commitment for new exploration should it return to Libya.

⁵² Libyan complicity for the La Belle bombing, as for Lockerbie later on, has been disputed by some commentators who note the more prominent role Syria and Iran have played in terrorist incidents, and the likely potential for Syrian-Palestinian-Iranian collusion that would cloud the degree of Libyan responsibility. See Davis, 116-117.

⁵³ Rose, 135.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 139-140.

⁵⁵ Adam Zagorin, "Why Libya Wants In," <u>Time</u> 155 no. 12 (27 March 2000): 66 [database on-line]; available from FirstSearch, Wilson Select Plus.

Jane Perlez, "Unpersuaded by Verdict, Bush Backs Sanctions," New York Times, 1

February 2001, sec. A, p. 12.

⁵⁷ Litwak, 254.

⁵⁸ Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, "Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies." <u>Survival</u> 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 135.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 117.

⁶⁰ Zagorin, Ibid.

⁶¹ Andrew Cockburn, "Libya," National Geographic 198, no. 5 (November 2000): 27.

⁶² In referring to unilateral sanctions, Vice President Cheney as been quoted as saying, "It is very hard to find specific examples where they actually achieve a policy objective." See Christopher Marquis, "Over the Years, Cheney Opposed U.S. Sanctions, "New York Times, 27 July 2000, sec A, p. 21.

63 Anthony Sampson, "Mandela: Britain Reneged on Libya, The (London) Independent, 9

February 2001, News sec., p. 2 (377 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis.

⁶⁴ Cooley, 170.

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